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Abstract
This paper provides a detailed description of the evaluation of
the GEA algorithm and the Trust component in the OpenKnowledge
(OK) project. In particular, it briefly recalls and discusses the imple-
mented trust component architecture and related algorithms, as well
as their integration into the OK Kernel architecture. The focus of
the paper is the presentation of the results of the evaluation of the
trust module on a selected e-Response scenario. Finally, we report
some preliminary results obtained using the propose trust module but
using a different and simplified trust model, in order to access the
modularity of the trust module used in OK.
1 Introduction
The issue of trust is famous for being a complicated one. This is basically
due to the lack of agreement on the notion of trust. A variety of trust
definitions exist in the literature, coming from diverging backgrounds with
different applications and different problem definitions.
In the OpenKnowledge context, trust is defined as a subjective measure of
the probability of a peer performing “well enough” based on its performance
history. The probability is computed by using the past history of collective
peer experience to predict the future behaviour of a given peer. However, the
trust measure is subjective because the definition of “well enough” depends
on several factors, such as the context, the peer in question, etc.
When a peer is planning to interact with others to achieve a given goal, a
peer (in the OpenKnowledge P2P system) should first select an interaction
model and then try to choose the peers it is willing to play with for the given
interaction model. Hence, there is a notion of implicit commitments that
each peer is taking when agreeing to play a given role in a given interaction
model. The idea is that during the course of an interaction, a peer can observe
the actions of others, compare them to the actions they have committed to
at the beginning of the interaction, and keep a record of this result in the
peer’s database of past experiences. In the future, when a peer questions
the trustworthiness of another in performing well in a given scenario, the
database of past experiences is consulted and the past experiences of similar
scenarios are obtained to help compute the probability distribution of the
peer’s future behaviour. This probability distribution is then used by the
peer to reach a subjective decision on whether the outcome of the interaction
will most likely be acceptable or not. The details of this trust model and
related algorithm have been presented in an earlier deliverable (see [1]).
The trust module has been implemented by building three different pack-
ages. These are the history, the ontology, and the statistics packages.
• The history package interfaces with the peer’s database of personal
experiences.
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• The ontology package interfaces with the peer’s local ontology.
• The statistics package is the package where all the statistical functions
needed for calculating trust are defined. For example, probability dis-
tributions, time decay functions, reliability measures, and the peer’s
customisable trust equations are all defined in this package.
When a trust measure needs to be calculated by the statistics package,
the history package is consulted to obtain the history of relevant past expe-
riences. Relevance is computed by making use of the similarity functions of
the ontology package. Similarity of interaction models, roles, and terms that
peers commit to are defined in this module. A general (and customisable)
similarity function that aggregates the results of all other similarity functions
is also defined. An earlier deliverable (see [2]) has already covered the trust
module’s implementation details.
The rest of this document is divided as follows. Section 2 presents the
basics of the OpenKnowledge kernel, which illustrates how peers select the
interactions they will engage in, who will they play with, etc. Section 3 in-
troduces the adaptations of both the trust module and the OpenKnowledge
kernel resulting from their final intergration. Section 4 recall briefly how the
trust model may be used along with the Good Enough Answer algorithm to
achieve a better peer selection process.Section 5 details some extensive ex-
periments and presents the related results of the evaluation the trust module
and GEA algorithm in the e-Response testbeds. Section 6, briefly reports
some preliminary comparisons between the trust model used in the previous
evaluation experiments and a different and simplified trust model, namely
PeerRank, before concluding with Section 7
2 OpenKnowledge Kernel basics
The OpenKnowledge kernel [3] provides the layer that assorted services and
applications can use to interact using a choreography-based architecture able
to deal both with the semantic heterogeneity of the actors and with their
discovery.
The framework allows a direct translation of a choreography oriented
design, such as the activity diagram in Figure 1, into an executable appli-
cation. The core concept is the interaction models, performed by different
applications and service providers. These actors are the participants of the
interactions, and they play roles in them. In an interaction all the roles have
equal weight; the behaviour of all the participants and in particular their
exchange of messages are specified. The roles in the interaction models are
played by the participants, called peers.
Interaction models are written in Lightweight Coordination Calculus (LCC)
[4, 5] and published by the authors on the distributed discovery service (DDS)
with a keyword-based description [6]. LCC is an executable choreography
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Figure 1: Activity diagram representing a poller-reporter interaction
language based on process calculus. An interaction model in LCC is a set of
clauses, each of which defines how a role in the interaction must be performed.
Roles are described by their type and by an identifier for the individual peer
undertaking that role. Participants in an interaction take their entry-role
and follow the unfolding of the clause specified using a combinations of the
sequence operator (‘then’) or choice operator (‘or’) to connect messages and
changes of role. Messages are either outgoing to (‘⇒’) or incoming from
(‘⇐’) another participant in a given role. A participant can take, during an
interaction, more roles and can recursively take the same role (for example
when processing a list). Message input/output or change of role is controlled
by constraints defined using the normal logical operators for conjunction and
disjunction. In its definition, LCC makes no commitment to the method
used to solve constraints - so different participants might operate different
constraint solvers (including human intervention). Figure 5 (in Section 5)
shows the LCC clauses for the poller-reporter interaction described in the
activity diagram of Figure 1.
The peers that want to perform some task, such as verifying the state
of flooding in some area, or providing the water-level information service,
search for published interaction models for the task by sending a keyword-
based query to the DDS. The DDS collects the published interaction models
matching the description (the keywords are extended adding synonyms to
improve recall) and sends back the list.
Interaction models and peers are designed by possibly different entities,
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and therefore the constraints and the peers’ knowledge bases are unlikely
to be perfectly corresponding. The heterogeneity problem is dealt splitting
the task in three phases and limiting its scope: (1) the DDS selects the
interactions by matching their descriptions using a simple query expansion
mechanism; (2) the peers compare the constraints in the received interaction
models with their own capabilities, and (3) finally the peers need to map the
terms appearing in constraints and introduced by other peers [7]. The scope
of the matching problem is limited to the specific interaction model in the
second phase, and to the specific interaction run in the third phase.
The peer capabilities are provided by plug-in components, called OKC.
An OKC exposes a set of Java methods that are compared to the constraints
in the interaction models. The comparison is performed between the signa-
tures of the constraints and of the methods, transforming them into trees
and verifying their distance [8]. The signatures can be annotated with the
semantics of each parameter, which can be structured terms, as we will see in
Section 3.1. The comparison process creates adaptors, that bridge the con-
straints to the methods. An adaptor has a confidence level, that reflects the
distance between the constraint and the best matching method: the average
of all the confidences of constraints gives a measure of how well the peer can
execute an interaction, and it used to select the most fitting one. Once the
peer has selected an interaction, it advertise its intention of interpreting one
of its roles to the discovery service by subscribing to it. Figure 2 shows the
state of a network when roles in at least one interaction are all subscribed by
at least one peer: IM1 has all the roles subscribed, and r3 is subscribed by
two peers (P3 and P4). The peers have installed locally their OKCs: some
OKCs can be found online, and are available to all, while some OKC might
be private to a peer (OKC4 for example is installed only on P4).
3 Trust model integration within the Open-
Knowledge Kernel
3.1 Adaptation of the OpenKnowledge kernel
As we have seen in Section 2, annotations are used to define the semantics of
constraints and methods. In this section we will describe how annotations are
written, and how they are also used to identify the constraints and message
relevant for computing trust.
An annotation is introduced by the @annotation keyword and can be
about any LCC element (defined as @role, @constraint, @message, @rolechange,
@variable), and is defined by a tree:
@annotation(@role(r1), root(branch1(leafA,leafB), branch2(leafC))))
@annotation(@message(msg(X)), commitment(msg(title)))
...
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Figure 2: OpenKnowledge architecture
Annotations can be recursive: so it is possible to annotate a particu-
lar message/variable/constraint inside a specific role, or a variable inside a
constraint inside a role:
@annotation(@role(r1),
@annotation(@message(msg(X)), commitment(msg(title))))
More concisely, an annotation is defined as:
annotation::= @annotation(about, annotation)
|@annotation(about, tree)
about::= @role(lcc-role-name)
|@message(message-signature)
|@constraint(constraint-signature)
|@variable(variable-name)
tree::=tree|constant
Annotations are written inside the LCC protocol. By convention, they
are written before the role they are annotating.
3.1.1 Semantic Annotations
In order to match the semantic description of a method seen above with a
constraint, the variables in the role need to be annotated:
@annotation( @role(r1),
@annotation( @variable(T), title ) )
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This means that the all the appearances of the variable T in the clause
of role r1 are of type title, where for type we mean ontological type.
So, for example, if there is a constraint:
info(T) => a(r2, B) <- getTitle(T)
the comparison between the constraint above and a method askTitle(title)
will be between the trees:
getTitle askTitle
|- title |-title
The scope of a variable is just a role clause, so you need to annotate
the variables for every role in which they appear: this means that variables
appearing in messages, sent from one role and received by another, have to
be annotated twice.
Variables can be annotated with structures:
@annotation(@role(reporter), @variable(WaterLevel)
water_level(level, unit))
3.1.2 Logging annotations
It is also possible to annotate messages, constraints and role changes in order
to log them during a run of an interaction. By default, nothing is logged, as
it would be inefficient: only elements that are annotated are logged.
The log is sent to all the peers that have taken part in the interaction: it
is up to the peer to decide what to do with them. Computing Trust is one
of the possibilities, but others are feasible.
Interaction events (message sent, received, constraint solved, failed, role
changed) are logged according to the format defined in the annotation (it is
also possible to exclude from the logging the values of some variables, using
the sign ).
A message can be annotated as follow:
@annotation(@role(reporter),
@annotation(@message(water_level(ReporterID,Node,TimeStep,WaterLevel)),
commitment(water_level(_,node,_,water_level(level,unit))))
)
where reporter id, node, timestep, water level(level,unit) are the
ontological types of the variables, as defined in the semantic annotation.
This means that the log received by the peers will contain a line similar
to the following:
senderEPID, receiverEPID, commitment,
water_level(reporter_id,32,timestep,water_level(5,mm))))
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Similarly, a constraint annotated as follow:
@annotation (@role(r1),
@annotation(@constraint(retrieve_flood_level(ReporterID,Node,Timestep,WaterLevel)),
memorize(retrieve_flood_level(_,node,_,water_level(level,unit))))
will be logged as:
solverID, memorize,
retrieve_flood_level(reporter_id,32,timestep,water_level(5,mm))
4 Good Enough Answers
The ability of a peer to play a role can be seen as a combination of three
factors:
1. The general trustworthiness of the peer: does the peer usually perform
a role it is subscribed to an in acceptable fashion?
2. The abilities of the peer: can the peer actually perform the kinds of
tasks required for this role? For example, if it is acting as a seller
for cars, has it previously been observed to sell cars of a satisfactory
nature? If it has no record of selling cars, has it sold similar items
successfully?
3. The suitability of the peer for this particular role: do its abilities match
well to the constraints of the IM? Even if it is proposing to take on the
role of car seller and it has previously sold cars successfully, it may still
fail if this is a different car selling IM and the methods involved are
rather different to those it has used before.
The estimation of a peer’s likelihood to perform a role satisfactorily -
whether or not it will be good enough at that role - must be calculated for a
particular peer potentially playing a role - the subscribed peer - by the peer
that has to determine whether or not to interact with that peer - the choosing
peer .
Factors one and two are evaluated in the trust algorithm, which returns
a trust score for this particular peer playing this particular role. The evalu-
ation of trust is based on prior experience on the part of the choosing peer:
either its own direct experience or the experience of others which it has re-
ceived through gossip. Matching is used in this trust calculation, in order to
work out how relevant prior experience is by determining how similar pre-
viously satisfied constraints are to those of the present IM. However, whilst
this does give helpful information about a peer’s ability, it cannot give full
information as it does not take into account what the actual abilities of a
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peer are. For example, a peer may have previously satisfied a constraint
such as sell(car(make,model, year)) and may now have to satisfy, for this
particular IM, the constraint sellCar(make, year). Evaluating the similarity
of these two is useful in determining the expected outcome of the present
IM. However, more useful would be to compare the actual ability of the sub-
scribed peer - for example, this could be sellCar(model,make, year). Since
this information is private, it is not possible for the choosing peer to access
it and use it for evaluation. But it is possible for the subscribed peer - who
will in any case have performed the matching so as to determine whether
or not it will subscribe - to make its matching score public. The choosing
peer’s complete evaluation of a subscribed peer’s ability to perform a role is
therefore a combination of the choosing peer’s calculated trust score and the
subscribed peer’s reported matching score.
Note that it is possible for a choosing peer to lie about its matching score
to make it more likely to be picked. In this case, it is likely to perform worse
than expected in that role, leading to its trust score being lowered, which
should, over time, ensure that such peers are not chosen despite their high
reported matching scores. However, in the present evaluation testbed we
assume that peers present their matching scores honestly.
The good enough answers (GEA) algorithm therefore allows a choosing
peer to combine its trust score with the reported matching score to determine
the peer that is most likely to perform a given role well, or to refuse to interact
with any of the peers if they all fall below the threshold. A single score in [0
1] is calculated by averaging the two scores, which are both in [0 1]:
GEA score =
Trust Score + Matching Score
2
(1)
Note that the method of combining these two scores is one that is decided
pragmatically rather than theoretically, as there is no fixed way in which
this should happen. Other methods of combination, such as multiplication
or threshold lowering, could also be used. We do not investigate these possi-
bilities in the present evaluation.
5 Evaluation on e-Response
This section is concerned with the evaluation of Trust and GEA models in the
e-Response case study. A preliminary analysis of the main issues regarding
how trust can be computed in the e-Response test case was first carried
out. Such analysis started by considering the peer types and the emergency
scenarios adopted in the project. Once an overview of the e-response domain
was depicted, the concern was to understand which dimensions of the Trust
model can be reasonably applied in the testbed and how they can be applied.
From this perspective, the following questions needed to be addressed:
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1. Which emergency scenarios are better suited for trust evaluation?
2. For which of the peer types involved in these scenarios, assigning a
trust score is meaningful?
Subsequent to this preliminary analysis we setup and run experiments in
order to evaluate Trust and GEA models in a specific emergency response
scenario. With such evaluation, we aimed at testing the following hypothesis:
“Embedding a Trust and a GEA component, based respectively on the
Trust and GEA models defined in D4.5, into the OK-Kernel infrastructure
enhances the P2P system in the choice of trustworthy peers, that is, peers
which are likely to perform as expected given a certain task to solve”
Results were obtained which show how the above hypothesis can be con-
firmed in the selected use case.
The answers to the above questions, a detailed description of the exper-
iments and the analysis of the results obtained are given in the following
sections: Section 5.1 describes the peer types and the scenarios involved in
the eResponse test case; Section 5.2 outlines which aspects of the Trust model
can be incorporated in the e-response domain; Section 5.3 describes a spe-
cific e-response subscenario, the one selected to evaluate the models; finally,
Section 5.4 shows the methodology used to build and run the experiments as
well as the results achieved.
5.1 e-Response Case Study: an overview
In this section we give a brief overview of the overall e-Response use case,
describing both the peer types and the scenarios involved. A more compre-
hensive description of the eResponse use case can be found in the deliverable
6.8.
5.1.1 Peer types
Since a Trust model is aimed at supporting a peer in the choice of those
peers who will interact with it in the next future, it is essential to first
analyse the type of peers involved in the e-response testbed and, afterwards,
to find out the type of peers that will need to use the Trust and GEA model
as well as the type of peers on which computing a trust score makes sense.
Figure 3 represents a schematic view of the peer types (denoted by round
circles) involved in a possible flooding in Trentino. It also shows among
which peers the interactions take place. The smooth rectangle depicted in
the figure denotes the simulator,that is, the environment where all the peers
act; Obviously, it doesn’t correspond to any entity in the reality, therefore,
we don’t consider it in this context.
10
Figure 3: The eResponse peer types
The peers can be distinguished into two main categories: service peers
and emergency peers. While the former are basically peers providing services
under request, the latter are peers often acting on behalf of emergency hu-
man agents that are in charge of realizing the evacuation plan.
Service Peers
A short description of the service peers is given below :
• Weather Forecast Provider. Provides weather conditions (i.e., temper-
ature, rain probability, wind strength) given a specific location.
• Water Level Sensor. Represents a water level sensor placed in one of
the four strategic points along the Adige River; provides water level
information registered at the location where it is placed.
• Route Service. Provides a route connecting two given locations which
eventually doesn’t pass by a given set of undesired locations
• GIS Provider. Provides geographical information (map, coordinates)
whenever requested.
• Emergency Monitoring System (EMS): such system represents the server
station where all the information which are critical to the emergency
are collected. In particular, the system:
– collects weather forecast information;
– collects water level information from sensors located along Adige
river;
– analyses the previous information;
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– when needed, sends a proper alarm message to the emergency
coordinator;
Most of the above peer types are mainly involved in the prealarm phase
(see section 5.1.2) to support the emergency peers in the decision making
process.
Emergency Peers
As long as concern the emergency peers, a brief description of their main
characteristics follows:
• Emergency Coordinator: such peer is responsible for the coordination
of all the emergency activities, from the propagation of the alarm to
its subordinates, to resource allocation. Specifically, it:
– collects GIS information
– receives different levels of emergency alarm messages from the
EMS;
– collects specific weather information (i.e., temperature, rain prob-
ability, wind strength, etc.)
– sends directives to its subordinates (i.e., move to a specific point,
close a meeting point)
• Moving Peer: it is a peer (i.e., a firefighter, a bus, a citizen) which need
to move to a specific location;
• Civilian Protection: it is responsible for giving information on the
blockage state of a given path.
• Reporter: it is responsible for giving information on the water level
registered at its location. It could turn to be a service peer (i.e., a
sensor permanently placed at a location ) or a real person (i.e., a person
peer providing information about his/her own environment and current
experiences).
5.1.2 Emergency scenarios
In this section we first give a short description of the overall emergency
response scenario implemented with the OpenKnowledge infrastructure; we
then outline a specific subscenario, the one selected as a meaningful and
realistic scenario where to evaluate the Trust and GEA models.
Figure 4 represents a schematic view of the phases involved in a pos-
sible flooding in Trentino. Furthermore, it shows the kind of information
exchanged in the interactions between the peers. The red circle surrounds
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Figure 4: The overall eResponse scenario
peers and interactions which are the focus of the Trust and GEA evaluation.
There are two main phases which compose the scenario: a prealarm and
an evacuation phase.
In the prealarm phase are involved mainly service peers which are, as has
been previously said, peers providing all that information needed to make
a decision on whether to enact the emergency plan or not. Peers like a
weather service peer, a water level sensor peer or a GIS service peer are
example of such peers. The evacuation phase regards the evacuation plan
itself, therefore, all the activities which are needed to move people to safe
places. In such phase, the key peers are emergency peers, that is, all the peers
in charge of helping in the evacuation of citizen: emergency coordinators,
firefighters, government agencies (i.e., civilian protection), real-time water
level data reporters (i.e., people, sensors). Of course, such emergency peers
are supported by service peers such as route services, sensors scattered across
the emergency area, etc.
The overall scenario of the emergency case study considered in the Open-
Knowledge project can be summarized as follows: water level sensors, placed
in strategic positions (break points) along the Adige river, continuously send
data to the Emergency Monitoring System (EMS). This system, which is also
collecting information on the weather conditions registered in the city, noti-
fies the emergency chief whenever the acquired data cross a danger threshold.
The emergency chief then takes its decision on whether to enact the evac-
uation plan or not. The evacuation plan consists of peers (typically citizen
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with the support of firefighters and Civilian Protection buses) moving to safe
locations. In order to move, such peers need to perform some activities like
choosing a path to follow (usually by asking a route service), checking if the
path is practicable (usually by interacting with the Civilian Protection or
with available reporters distributed in the area), proceeding along the path.
The Civilian Protection can deliver information on the blockage state of some
given path to a requester. It is able to do that since it is continuously polling
sensors scattered around the emergency area. Such sensors report the water
level registered at their locations.
Prealarm Scenarios
The scenarios pertaining the prealarm phase and which are modeled in
terms of LCC interaction models are three. A short description for each of
them follows:
1. Checking weather conditions : the emergency coordinator request pe-
riodically a weather forecast (i.e., rain, temperature) in order to make
previsions and therefore decisions on the actions to take.
2. Measuring water level along the river (through sensors) : a central
monitoring system requests continuously the level of water registered
at critical positions along the river. Such information is crucial to enact
the evacuation plan.
3. Requesting Geographical information : an emergency coordinator,
asks for a geographical map of the area involved in the emergency.
Evacuation Scenarios
The main scenarios involved in the evacuation phase are described
shortly below:
4. Evacuation: describes how an evacuation plan evolves. An emergency
coordinator alerts members to go to a specific destination. Each mem-
ber finds a path to reach the destination, checks its status and eventu-
ally move along the path
5. Find a route: describes the interaction needed to retrieve a path from
a route service.
6. Check path status: describes the interactions with the Civilian Protec-
tion needed to know the blockage state of a path.
7. Poll reporters for real-time data: models the interactions between a
peer asking for information on the water level registered at some loca-
tions and reporters located at that locations.
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The latter scenario is the one selected to evaluate the Trust and GEA
models (see the portion of Figure 4 contained in the red circle). In particu-
lar, the interaction is between the Civilian Protection peer (in the role of a
requester) and many reporter peers (sensors in our case) acting as water level
data providers. More details on this interaction are given in Section 5.3.
5.2 Trust dimensions in e-Response
In this section some considerations are made in regards to which dimensions
of the Trust model are revelant for the e-response scenarios and the peer
types previously described. It is worth to recall here that the Trust module
comprises two different aspects on which the peer is trust assessed: how ca-
pable the peer is in doing something and how willing it is to do it (refer to
D4.5 for more details).
However, before even going into this discussion, it is necessary to understand
which are the peers for which computing the trust is meaningful. The ques-
tion is: for which of the above peer types computing trust does make sense?
We can exclude from the list peers like the emergency coordinator and the
emergency monitoring system (they are the only ones; so there are no al-
ternatives in the selection). Peers like firefighters, reporters, medical stuff,
bus drivers are instead good candidates for being trust assessed, although
usually prior the actual emergency. As long as concern service peers (water
level sensors, weather forecast services, route services), it may seem they are
to be excluded (they are not real emergency response peers) but since the
quality and the effectiveness of an emergency response strongly depends on
them we can surely consider them. The trust may therefore be computed on
the following peers:
• Water Level Sensors: within a set of water level sensors placed in a
given location, a requester would select the one who usually gives more
accurate water level values and in the format actually requested (i.e.,
in meter rather than in millimeter).
• Weather service: among two or three available weather services, the
emergency coordinator peer will need to choose the one who usually
gives more accurate data on the weather conditions registered at a
certain location.
• Route service: among two or three available route services, an emer-
gency peer (i.e., firemen, bus driver)will choose the one that is more
reliable in providing updated information on the routes to take. For
example, between a route service ignoring the blockage state of a piece
of road and another which instead doesn’t, the emergency peer would
choose the latter one.
• Firefighters,policemen,bus driver: among a set of firefighters (or police-
men or bus drivers) and given a certain task to solve, an emergency
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peer must decide which is the peer who can likely perform better. The
decision making problem is done by considering some history of how
the personnel behave in previously assigned duties; parameters like the
speed in performing the tasks requested may be considered as a mea-
sure of choice thought other measures may be possible (i.e., decision
effectiveness: how capable a peer is in taking good decisions in risky
situations and in an autonomous way)
Some observations on the meaning of the trust components (capabilities
and willingness) in the peer types follow.
Trust on service peers
In general, the concept of “willingness” cannot be applied to a service peer: it
doesn’t represent a peer able to take decision independently, it just provides
a service whenever requested. On the other hand, the “capability” aspect of
the Trust module can be understood for such kind of peers as a quality of
service. For example, a trust score relative to a water level sensor gives a
measure of how accurate is the information returned.
Some observations may be useful at this point when thinking to realis-
tic cases and to the actual functioning of the OpenKnowledge infrastructure.
Service peers often rely on existing web services. For example, a weather fore-
cast peer may rely on free available services like weather.com, meteo trentino,
and others. From the perspective of the Openknowledge infrastructure, the
OKCs related to the role of “weather provider” will probably be wrappers to
the above mentioned existing web services. Therefore, assigning a trust value
to a weather provider peer means assessing the quality of the service invoked
by the peer in question. The problem arises when the service invoked by
the peer is down or is overwhelmed by many other user requests, which can
comes from OK-enabled peers or normal users. In this case, should the trust
score of the weather provider be decreased for the missing service? Here,
the assumption is that every peer is responsible for solving the given task,
whatever it may happen externally.
Trust on emergency peers
Also in this case, the concept of willingness doesn’t usually apply to an
emergency peer. In fact, it is reasonable to assume that every firefighter is
willing to help in an emergency context unless the situation is very risky, in
which case an emergency peer may not want to fulfill the assigned duty for
its own safety. In our scenarios we don’t consider such situations.
In conclusion, the experiments built to evaluate the Trust and GEA model
in the e-response domain, involve service peers (sensors) and are grounded in
the previously mentioned scenario: a peer (civilian protection) periodically
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requests information on the water level registered at N locations.
5.3 Selected e-response scenario
The e-response scenario selected for Trust and GEA evaluation concerns
the activity of the Civilian Protection Unit during the emergency. Such
agency should support emergency peers or evacuees during their moving, by
informing them of both blocked and free locations in the area. In order to
provide this service, the Civilian Protection keeps updated on the level of
water registered at some locations in the emergency area: it periodically
retrieves such information from sensors positioned in these locations. Notice
that, in place of fixed sensors, the source of the information could be reporters
(i.e., emergency peers, volunteers, evacuees) situated, in a given moment, at
some locations. To recall this generalization we will use, in what follows, the
word “reporter” instead of “sensor”.
Since more than one reporter can be placed in one location, it is crucial
for the Civilian Protection to get, for each location, the more accurate water
level data possible.
The choice of this particular scenario as a suitable one to test both Trust
and GEA models was driven by the decision of considering such pressing and
realistic requirement into our emergency testcase.
In the next subsections we describe the peers involved in the scenario,
the possible strategies adopted by the Civil Protection to choose a sensor for
each location and some relevant LCC snippets which model the scenario.
5.3.1 Involved peers
As can be intuited, the peers involved in the emergency scenario selected
for the Trust and GEA evaluation are the Civilian Protection Unit and the
reporter.
The Civilian Protection Unit
As stated above, this agency supports other peers in the evacuation phase
by giving them real-time information on the blockage state of a location. To
provide the service, the Civilian Protection selects a reporter, in a given time
and for each location, to ask the water level. All the information retrieved
are stored in a local database which will be used to satisfy the requests of
peers in need of route information.
The Reporter
As previously mentioned, this peer is responsible for giving information
on the water level registered at its location. It could be either an human
agent willing to provide information on the water level he/her observes at
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the location where he/her temporarily is or a water level sensor permanently
placed at a given location.
5.3.2 Selection strategies
The Civilian Protection Unit needs to select the reporter peers every time it
has to interact with them. The selection hence happens before an interaction
commences. Such interaction consists in asking a reporter peer the water
level registered at its locations. The activity of requesting the water level
information is repeated periodically. In our simulation, we denoted the time
when a request is forwarded to a reporter peer as timestep. At each timestep,
as many requests as the number of locations of interest are sent on. Thus, at
each timestep, the Civilian Protection Unit has to select one reporter peer
per location. In what follows, a location is referred to as a node. There
can be different selection strategies which can be adopted by the Civilian
Protection Unit. Here, we analyse the three strategies which are tested and
compared with the experiments described in section 5.4.
• Random Strategy: this strategy is the simplest one. The selecting peer
(the Civil Protection Unit in our case) first groups the peers subscribed
to the “reporter” role according to their locations. Then, for each node,
it picks up a peer in a random way. This strategy doens’t take into
account any information on the behaviour assumed by a peer in the past
interactions: all peers are regarded as good peers for the interaction to
come.
• Trust Strategy: this strategy takes into account the trust scores of
the peers subscribed to the “reporter” role. As before, all the peers
are grouped by node; then, a trust score is computed using information
from past interactions and, finally, the peer with the highest trust score
is selected for each node. Peers having identical highest trust score are
subject to a random selection. This strategy is more sophisticated
than the previous one and provides the selecting peer with a way to
choose a reporter peer according to the results it gave in possible past
interactions. Of course, for this strategy being effective, the selecting
peer must have some past experience with the peers it want to interact
with. Since, in our scenario, the action of selecting and interacting
with a reporter peer is repeated periodically, the Civilian Protection
Unit can exploit the results of past interactions and therefore use this
strategy in a powerful way.
• GEA Strategy: this strategy is similar to the previous one except that a
reporter peer is evaluated with a score (the GEA score) which takes into
account both the trust and the matching score. A combination of these
two scores is therefore computed. In the GEA selection implemented,
the GEA score is (Trust + Matching) / 2. As before, the peer with the
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highest GEA score is selected for each node and, if many peer have the
same highest GEA score, one is selected randomly.
5.3.3 LCC description
The LCC interaction specification used to model the communication between
the Civilian Protection Unit and a reporter peer is composed by two main
roles: the querier role and the reporter role (see Figure 5 ).
The heading of the specification specifies that the reporter role can be
played by more than one peer, the maximum number allowed being 200.
The Civil Protection Unit will take the role of querier with a subscription
description of the type “querier(all)”, while a reporter peer will subscribe to
the reporter role with a subscription description of the type “reporter(node)”,
where node univocally identifies a specific geographic location.
By subscribing as a “querier(all)”, the Civilian Protection Unit specifies
which is interested in all the nodes present in the emergency area. However,
if the interest is just in a subset of the locations, it is possible to subscribe as
a “querier(node1,...,nodeN )”. This sort of mechanisms allows a flexible use
of the interaction specification which doesn’t need to be modified when the
locations of interest change.
The querier role entails two sub-roles: the sender and the receiver role.
The Civilian Protection Unit (CPU) first gets the current timestep Timestep
and then retrieves the list of all the peers which are playing the reporter
role. Notice that these peers where previously selected according to one of
the three strategies already described. After this, the CPU enters the role
sender in order to send the message request flood status(Timestep) to all the
selected reporter peers. Once the messages are sent, the CPU computes a
waiting time WaitTime which represents the maximum wait time for the
reception of the responses expected from the reporter peers. This time is
proportional to the number N of messages awaited.
The CPU enters the role receiver, thus awaiting for water level information
from the reporter peers. The LCC specification for this role comprises two
main parts: one models the the reception of the message water level and the
other shapes the time which is elapsing. The information embedded in the
water level message are: (1) an identification of the reporter ReporterID ; (2)
the identification of the location Node; (3) the timestep Timestep represent-
ing when the information was requested and, most important, (4) the value
of the water level WaterLevel registered by the reporter at the location.
After having received the message, the CPU stores the data just acquired
(constraint update flood record of Figure 5) and waits for other similar mes-
sages from other reporters. If the wait time established by the CPU expires
and not all the reporters have replied, the CPU terminates the interaction
thus missing some water level data.
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r(querier,initial)
r(sender,auxiliary)
r(receiver,auxiliary)
r(reporter,necessary,1,200)
a(querier,Q) ::
null← getTimestep(Timestep) and getPeers(“reporter”,SPL) then
a(sender(Timestep,SPL),Q) then
null← size(SPL,N ) and getWaitTime(N ,WaitTime) then
a(receiver(WaitTime,N ),Q)
a(sender(Timestep,SPL),Q) ::
null← SPL = []
or
(
null← SPL = [H|T ] then
request flood status(Timestep)⇒ a(reporter ,H ) then
a(sender(Timestep,SPL),Q)
)
a(receiver(WaitTime,N ),Q) ::
null← equalZero(N )
or
(
water level(ReporterID,Node, T imestep,WaterLevel)⇐ a(reporter ,R) then
null← update flood record(Node,WaterLevel, ReporterID, T imestep) and dec(N,NewN ) then
a(receiver(WaitTime,NewN ),Q)
)
or
(
null← equalZero(WaitTime)
or
(
null← sleep(1000) and dec(WaitTime,NewWaitTime) then
a(receiver(NewWaitTime,N ),Q)
)
)
a(reporter,R) ::
request flood status(Timestep)⇐ a(sender ,Q) then
water level(ReporterID,Node, T imestep,WaterLevel)⇒ a(receiver ,Q)
null← retrieve flood level(ReporterID,Node, T imestep,WaterLevel)
Figure 5: LCC code for the poll-reporter interaction
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The reporter role is very straightforward: after having received the mes-
sage request flood status the reporter peer retrieves the water level sensed
(see constraint retrieve flood level of Figure 5). Notice that the value of the
water level registered by a reporter may not correpond to the real value (i.e.,
the reporter peer is an untrustworthy peer). Once the water level is retrieved,
the reporter peer send the message water level back to the requester.
5.4 Trust and GEA Experiments
5.4.1 Experiment set-up
In this section we present the details of the architecture used to run the
experiments for the selected e-Response scenarios. The experiment was de-
veloped using Java v1.6 and PostgreSQL v8.1.
Database description
In order to test the selected scenario we have built a system in which
we can dynamically define several scenario configurations according to the
characteristics we want to test. Figure 6 shows a view of the database design
that includes only the entities which are relevant to the experiment definition.
The figure shows only a subset of all the entities defined in the database.
Figure 6: View of the database design for the objects relevant to the experi-
ment definition.
Figure 6 shows that an experiment is defined by an identifier (exp id), a
description (description) of the experiment, the total number of sensor peers
(total peers) that will be launched, the maximum time step (max timestep)
and the total number of nodes (total nodes) that will be involved.
For the selected scenario we created 73 nodes in total, which represent 73
geographical points in the city of Trento. These nodes are depicted as red
dots in Figure 7; they represent the geographical points from which the Civil
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Protection Unit will be collecting water-levels. Given a max timestep of 50,
we ran the flood sub-simulator (explained in the project Deliverable 6.8 [9])
in order to generate, for each node and each time step, the water-level value.
Figure 7: Nodes in the map of Trento
The complete setting of an experiment is defined as the combination
of the data in the experiment table, the behaviors and the OKCs to be
used (explained further in this chapter). Each experiment can define a dif-
ferent combination of such parameters. The table experiment behavior in
Figure 6 defines which behavior (behavior id) are to be used for a given
experiment, plus the incidence (behavior incidence) of each of them. The
incidence (behavior incidence) defines the number of peers that will have
the corresponding behaviour, expressed as a percentage of the total num-
ber of peers (defined in total peers of the experiment table). The table
experiment OKC defines the OKCs to be used in a given experiment, and
also the incidence (okc incidence) of each of them (the percentage of the
total number of peers).
The behavior table defines the possible behaviors. This generates the
errors that will be added to the real water-level values given by the flood sub-
simulator. For the current experiment we defined two types of behaviors, the
“Correct” behaviour, with an error of 0, and an “Incorrect” behavior, with
an error of 0.9.
The OKC (Open Knowledge Component) - see [10] for more information
- table in Figure 6 defines which class will be used in each of the sensor
peers. A sensor’s OKC defines how it will satisfy the constraint defined in
the poll sensor LCC. Figure 8 shows an extract of the poll sensor LCC, cor-
responding to the reporter role, which the sensor peers have to subscribe
to. Figure 8 highlights the constraint to be solved by the sensor peer. This
means that all the sensor OKCs have to implement a method which is sim-
ilar enough to this constraint as computed by the OpenKnowledge Matcher
module [11].
In order to simulate an open peer-to-peer environment, we created six
different OKCs, each of them with a specific signature, similarity score,
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Figure 8: Constraint to be solved by the sensor peer
and expected performace. In this way, we simulated the real case in which
a given peer can provide a service that is similar enough to what is required
(defined by the LCC), but not exactly equal. Table 1 shows the OKCs defined
for the selected e-Response scenario. Each OKC has a different signature; the
similarity column shows the similarity score as computed by the matcher
module of the OpenKnowledge kernel.
Table 1: Defined OKCs for the experiment
We have created two types of OKCs in order to simulate the case in which,
even though a peer has a very high similarity score (and therefore a similar
signature) but the implemented method does not perform exactly the same
way as it is expected by the interaction model. The expected performance
column from Table 1 defines whether the OKC method will perform as speci-
fied in the LCC (indicated by e), or not (indicated by p). In our experiments,
by “performing as expected” we mean that the method should return the
water-level value in meters. Therefore, we have a way to control the perfor-
mance of the peer, from the point of view of the type of results the peer will
be returning, independent of its actual behaviour (Correct or Incorrect).
Using this structure we can define the overall result (water-level) of a sensor
peer by the aggregation of the behavior and the expected performance of the
OKC. The possible combinations are:
• Perfect sensor peer: a peer with correct behaviour (therefore not
adding any error to the water-level), a perfect matching score and per-
formanceas expected. This is the ideal case where the peer will give
correct results.
• Good sensor peer: a peer with a correct behaviour, a matching score
lower than 1, and performance as expected. This is the case where the
peer will give correct results, even though it does not have a perfect
matching score.
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• Damaged sensor peer: a peer with incorrect behavior (e.g., because
it’s damaged), and performance as expected. In this case the peer will
be giving inaccurate results.
• Foreigner sensor peer: a peer with correct behavior, but with an
OKC not performing as expected (poor performance p): for example,
a peer using a different unit to the expected one; that is, instead of
returning the correct results in meters (as expected), it returns them
in inches, millimetres, etc. This case can be understood as if the peer
has a correct behaviour (the water-level value is correct), but the peer
“speaks a different language”, resulting in an overall inaccurate water-
level value (in the sense the value is not what it was expected).
• Damaged foreigner sensor peer: a peer with incorrect behavior,
plus it “speaks a different language”. Then the resulting value will be
obviously inaccurate.
As can be seen in Table 1, we have defined three OKCs to have poor
performance p. The transformations done for each of the poor performing
OKCs are as follows considering their okc id:
• 2: The OKC returns the result in centimetres.
• 3: The OKC returns the result in inches.
• 4: The OKC returns the water-level in relation to the sea-water-level,
i.e., it adds 190 to the result, which is the height of the city of Trento
above sea level.
In order to generate the peers for a given experiment, we have created a
procedure that, given an experiment identifier (exp id), retrieves the corre-
sponding behaviors and OKCs, and fills the sensor peer table automatically,
creating the corresponding peers by considering the incidence of behaviours
and OKCs. This means that it is relatively easy to create new settings to
test the different characteristics of the several modules of the OpenKnowledge
kernel, more specifically the Trust module, which is the aim of the current
deliverable.
Annotations for the poll sensor interaction model
In order to enable the full capabilities of the matcher module over the
constraints and variables of the LCC, we have annotated the variables related
to the constraints in the reporter role (Figure 9). We have also annotated the
message that will be used by the Trust module to compute the trust score.
The message water level annotated as commitment represents the message
that the peer under trust evaluation have to commit to, and therefore is
used as input for the Trust module as defined in the Trust algorithm [1].
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The constraint retrieve flood level annotated to be memorised is used to
asses the capability of a peer, i.e., how capable the peer is of satisfying the
constraints for the role it is willing to play. The details on how trust is
computed is out of the scope of this deliverable; for more details refer to
Deliverable 4.5 and 4.8.
@annotation (@role (reporter) ,@annotation (@variable(ReporterID), reporterID))
@annotation (@role (reporter) ,@annotation (@variable(Node), node))
@annotation (@role (reporter) ,@annotation (@variable(Timestep), timestep))
@annotation (@role (reporter) ,@annotation (@variable(WaterLevel), waterLevel))
@annotation(@role(reporter)
, @annotation(@message(water level(ReporterID,Node, T imestep,WaterLevel))
, commitment(water level(ReporterID,Node, T imestep,WaterLevel))))
@annotation(@role(reporter)
, @annotation(@constraint(retrieve flood level(ReporterID,Node, T imestep,WaterLevel)
, memoize(retrieve flood level( , , , ))))
Figure 9: Semantic annotations relative to the polling reporters interaction
model
5.4.2 Running the experiment
In this section we present the configurations we have selected in order to run
the experiments for the chosen e-Response test scenario.
Selected experiments configurations
We have defined 7 experiments in order to evaluate the selection strategies
(Random, Trust and GEA) described in previous sections. We specified all
the experiments in such a way that each node in the topology will have
at least one perfect or good sensor peer. By doing this, the worst case
scenario is that a node would have only one peer that will give correct results,
with all the other peers giving incorrect results. This means that, with
one of the informed selection strategies (based on information from previous
interactions), the number of time steps needed to select a good peer is, in
the worst case, the number of sensor peers in a node.
The rationale behind the definition of these experiments was to test how
different variables impact on the quality of the results of the selection strate-
gies. The variables being considered are the number of nodes, the number of
peers per node, and the number of perfect peers per experiment.
Table 2 shows the values for the variables in each of the experiments.
Experiments 1, 2, 3 and 7 are defined to evaluate the impact of an increasing
number of nodes in the selection strategies. Experiments 1, 2, 6 and 7 are
defined to study the effect of an increasing on the number of peers per node.
Experiments 3, 4 and 5 are defined to study the impact of the distribution
of perfect peers over the nodes, i.e., the cases when all the nodes have per-
fect peers, some nodes have perfect peers, and no nodes have perfect peers.
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Experiment
number
Number of
nodes
Number of
peers per
node
Total num-
ber of
peers
Number
of perfect
peers
1 2 10 20 2
2 4 20 80 4
3 6 20 120 6
4 6 20 120 0
5 6 20 120 3
6 3 40 120 1
7 73 4 292 29
Table 2: Defined experiments
Finally, Experiment 7 is the large scale experiment which tests the different
modules of the OpenKnowledge kernel, using a large number of peers and all
the nodes of the topology.
Experiment execution
The experiment execution consists of a single run of a selected configura-
tion (experiment) of the chosen e-Response scenario. In order to launch the
experiment we developed a java class (LaunchExperiment) that takes as in-
put the experiment identifier (exp id) and the selection strategy we want to
use for the run. The exp id is used to select the corresponding sensors from
the database. For each selected sensor, a new instance of the OpenKnowl-
edge kernel is then launched as a separate process. The necessary steps to
run an experiment are the following:
1. Launch the discovery service (DS): the DS is the repository
needed to store information about the available interaction models,
and the peer subscriptions to these interaction models. For all the ex-
periments, we initiate two instances of the discovery service in order to
equally distribute the load given by the number of the peers.
2. Publish the interaction model: the poll sensor interaction model
described in Section 5.3 is published. This is the interaction model
used to define how peers (sensor peers and the Civil Protection Unit)
interact with each other.
3. Launch the sensor peers for the experiment: the LaunchExperiment
class is called with the experiment identifier. The class queries the
database in order to get all the relevant peers, and spawns a new Open-
Knowledge kernel for each one of the sensor peers needed. Each sensor
peer subscribes then to the reporter role of the poll sensor interaction
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model with a subscription description of the type ”reporter(nodeid)”,
where nodeid denotes the node where the sensor is located.
4. Launch the Civil Protection Unit (CP Unit) peer: this sub-
scribes to the querier role of the poll sensor interaction model with a
subscription description of the type querier(all), After launching the
CP Unit peer, all roles (querier and reporter) of the poll sensors in-
teraction model will be fulfilled and, therefore, the interaction model
will be executed. The results of an experiment run are stored in the
database for later analysis.
Since the necessary resources to run the different selection strategies were
demanding, all the experiment runs were carried out in three dedicated
servers at the University of Trento connected via a Gbit Ethernet LAN.
The characteristics of the servers are:
1. 8 processors (Intel(R) Xeon(R) 2.50GHz); 16GB RAM
2. 2 processors (Dual-Core AMD Opteron(tm) 2.6GHz); 10GB RAM
3. 2 processors (Dual-Core AMD Opteron(tm) 2.6GHz); 9GB RAM
All the peers (CP Unit and sensors) plus the Discovery Service were
distributively launched in these servers. In order to test the different modules
of the OpenKnowledge kernel, we used this configuration to try as many
capabilities during one single execution as possible, for example:
• Different instances of the Discovery Service were started in different
servers, testing the distributed and load balancing capabilities of the
DS.
• A large number of peers participated in the interaction model, which
tested the ability of the Discovery Service to store their information,
and the ability of the Coordinator to orchestrate the execution of the
interaction model with many peers.
• The interaction model as defined in the LCC was complex enough to
test several features of the LCC interpreter, such as recursion, annota-
tions, etc.
• Peers for a given experiment were instantiated in different servers, test-
ing the communication layer.
• Not all the peers had an OKC matching exactly the constraint in the
interaction model: this tested the Matcher module and tested the open-
world scenario where we may find similar but non-identical services to
the ones we need.
• Peers with different OKCs had different behaviors (correct/incorrect):
this tested the Trust module and its ability to identify peers with in-
correct behaviours.
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5.4.3 Experimental results
The aim of the experiments was to test the different selection strategies al-
ready defined in the previous chapters. Here we summarise the three selection
strategies:
• Random: first all the peers are grouped by node and all the peers are
given the same score, then a random peer is selected for each node.
• Trust: first all the peers are grouped by node, then a trust score is
computed using information from previous interactions and the peer
with the highest trust score is selected per node. If several peers have
the same highest trust score, a random choice is made between them.
• GEA: first all the peers are grouped by node, then a GEA score is
computed as the combination of the trust score and the matching score
of the peer. The peer with the highest GEA score is selected at each
node. If several peers have the same highest GEA score, a random
choice is made between them.
In order to evaluate the results of a given selection strategy we defined a
quality metric. We used the mean absolute error metric defined in equation
2. It measures how accurate a given selection strategy is in selecting peers
with correct results.
errort =
1
n
·(
n∑
i=1
|ei|), (2)
where t denotes the time step, n denotes the number of nodes, and ei
is the error defined in equation 3. In Equation 3, water levelo denotes the
obtained water-level (i.e., the result given by a sensor peer), and water levelr
denotes the real water-level as given by the flood sub-simulator.
ei =
{
0.5 if (water levelo 6= water levelr)
0 otherwise
(3)
Note that ei is not defined as (water levelo − water levelr) as it is usu-
ally defined, since what we want to evaluate is how many correct peers
were selected by the selection strategy, not the overall distance between
the real water-level value water levelr and the obtained water-level value
water levelo. Equation 3 allows us to normalise the difference. In conclu-
sion, we want to minimise the number of peers giving incorrect results.
Results
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For each one of the experiments defined in Table 2 we run the complete
setting with three selection strategies: Random Selection, Trust, and GEA.
For each of these selection strategies we run the experiment 15 times in order
to get statistically significant results. All the figures that follow represent
average results for the 15 runs, for each of the selection strategies.
Figure 10: Mean absolute error for experiment 1. (2 nodes, 10 peers per
node, 2 perfect peers)
Figure 10 shows the mean absolute error for experiment 1 as define in
Table 2. The figure shows the results for the initial experiment, defined with
two nodes and ten peers per node, and where all the nodes had at least one
perfect peer. This initial experiment was carried out using only ten time
steps in order to see the preliminary results of the Trust and GEA models.
In the subsequent experiments the maximum number of time steps was set
to 50. The initial results show that the selection strategies based on the
use of information learnt in previous interactions improves peer selection.
As we can see, the Trust based selection strategy is clearly better than the
Random selection strategy. In this experiment configuration, GEA clearly
outperforms the other two selections strategies. This means that in a setting
where we have at least one perfect peer per node, GEA performs better than
trust alone.
Figure 11 shows the result for Experiment 1 with the standard deviation
σ. Let us define the following notation for the rest of the chapter. The
standard deviation for the Random selection strategy will be denoted by σR,
the standard deviation for the Trust selection strategy will be denoted by σT ,
and the standard deviation for the GEA selection strategy will be denoted by
σG. We can observe from Figure 11 that, in general, σG is smaller than σT ,
which in turn is smaller than σR. From σR we can infer that in some cases
the Random selection strategy also selects correct peers, but this selection
29
does not remain constant, and, moreover, on average, the Random selection
strategy selects bad peers.
Figure 11: Mean absolute error with standard deviation for experiment 1. (2
nodes, 10 peers per node, 2 perfect peers)
Figure 12 shows the results for Experiment 2. The rationale behind the
definition of this experiment was to study the behavior of the selection strate-
gies when we duplicate the number of nodes and the number of peers per
node. Thus, Experiment 2 consists of 4 nodes with 20 peers per node, where
each node has at least one perfect peer. As can be observed from Figure 12,
increasing the number of nodes and peers does not change the general shape
of the mean absolute error curves. The Random selection strategy has an
average error of ∼0.5; the Trust selection strategy shows better results, but
again is outperformed by GEA. From Figure 13 we can conclude that results
are statistically significant and that σT and σG decrease with time, while σR
remains approximately constant.
Figures 14 and 15 show the results for Experiment 3. In this experiment
we wanted to test the impact of increasing the number of nodes over the
selection strategies. As we can see from the figures bellow, the mean absolute
error for all the selection strategies retain the same general characteristics as
the ones for experiment 1 and 2 (Figures 10, 11, 12 and 13). We can conclude
that an increase in the number of nodes does not affect the general behavior
of the selection strategies.
Figures 16 and 17 show the results for Experiment 4. In the definition of
this experiment we wanted to see the effect of not having a perfect peer in
the nodes. In this experiment there are no peers with both perfect matching
score and correct behaviour, but we do have incorrect behavior with perfect
matching (damaged sensor peers). The experiment is meant to stress test
the selection strategy and to study how the presence of such damaged sensor
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Figure 12: Mean absolute error for experiment 2. (4 nodes, 20 peers per
node, 4 perfect peers)
Figure 13: Mean absolute error with standard deviation for experiment 2. (4
nodes, 20 peers per node, 4 perfect peers)
peers affect their performance; would a given selection strategy be able to pin
the peers down and discard them (by lowering their score) in the subsequent
interactions?
As we can see from Figures 16 and 17, the Random and Trust selection
strategies maintain the same behaviour, while the GEA selection strategy
clearly changes the mean absolute error in the initial time steps. This change
can be understood if we take into account that GEA uses matching informa-
tion in order to select the peers. This means that, when there is no previous
information (previous interactions with the peers), GEA will try to select
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Figure 14: Mean absolute error for experiment 3. (6 nodes, 20 peers per
node, 6 perfect peers)
Figure 15: Mean absolute error with standard deviation for experiment 3. (6
nodes, 20 peers per node, 6 perfect peers)
first those peers having higher matching score: all the bad peers (recall that
in this experiment the peers with a perfect matching score have an incorrect
behaviour). However, during the first time steps GEA learns (via Trust) how
the selected peers behave incorrectly and, as a consequence, start to select
peers from the second best matching score group. After some time steps,
GEA finds the correct behaving peers and starts to select them, giving re-
sults as good as the ones returned by Trust; finally in subsequent time steps,
GEA even outperforms Trust.
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Figure 16: Mean absolute error for experiment 4. (6 nodes, 20 peers per
node, no perfect peer)
Figure 17: Mean absolute error with standard deviation for experiment 4. (6
nodes, 20 peers per node, no perfect peer)
We can conclude here that using Trust as selection strategy can be better
than GEA in scenarios where we are not sure about the distribution of the
types of peers among all the nodes.
Figures 18 and 19 show the results for Experiment 5. In this experiment
we wanted to evaluate the case where 50% of the nodes had perfect peers.
This experiment is set with six nodes, 20 peers per node, and three perfect
peers, each assigned to different nodes. We can notice how the Random and
Trust selection strategies have the same shape of the previous experiments.
On the other hand, we can observe that the GEA results resemble the Trust
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ones, being slightly worse at the beginning, but better after time step 7. We
can infer that, on average, when half of the nodes have perfect peers, GEA
and Trust performances are comparable.
Figure 18: Mean absolute error for experiment 5. (6 nodes, 20 peers per
node, 3 perfect peers)
Figure 19: Mean absolute error with standard deviation for experiment 5. (6
nodes, 20 peers per node, 3 perfect peers)
Figures 20 and 21 show the results for Experiment 6. With this experi-
ment we evaluated the performance of the Trust and GEA selection strategies
when the number of peers per node is further increased. The experiment is
set with 3 nodes, 40 peers per node and 1 perfect peer. We can deduce from
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Figures 20 and 21 that the number of time steps taken by a given selec-
tion strategy to have an average error of 0 is dependent on the number of
peers they have to select. This observation might be intuitive, since, in the
worst case, a selection strategy could first select all the peers giving incorrect
results, and then select peers giving accurate results. By comparing these
two Figures (20 and 21) with Figure 10 (experiment 1: 10 peers per node)
and Figure 12 (experiment 2: 20 peers per node), it can be seen that in all
the cases Trust and GEA selection strategies comply with the worst case
expected results (i.e, the error is minimised to 0 in a time step that is less or
equal than the total number of peers per node).
Figure 20: Mean absolute error for experiment 6. (3 nodes, 40 peers per
node, 1 perfect peer)
In order to test the complete selected e-Response scenario, we have also
defined an experiment with 73 nodes as provided in the e-Response evacua-
tion scenario (experiment 7). In this case we defined only 4 peers per node,
since we already showed how an increased number of peers per node does
not affect the performance of both Trust and GEA selection strategies. The
definition of the experiment ensure that all the nodes have at least one peer
giving correct results, but does not necessarily ensure that all the nodes have
perfect peers. In fact, only 29 nodes have perfect peers, approximately half
of the nodes.
Figures 22 and 23 show the results for Experiment 7. The results given by
Trust and GEA are very similar, again outperforming the Random selection
strategy, which shows a trend similar to all the previous experiments. We
can see also that both Trust and GEA have an error of zero in time step 3,
which is less than the number of peers per node (4 peers per node for this
experiment). This experiment demonstrates that both GEA and Trust give
consistent results, even when the number of nodes increases.
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Figure 21: Mean absolute error with standard deviation for experiment 6. (3
nodes, 40 peers per node, 1 perfect peer)
Figure 22: Mean absolute error for experiment 7. (73 nodes, 4 peers per
node, 29 perfect peers)
The results presented so far measure the outcome of the selection strate-
gies according to the quality (mean absolute error) of the selection of the
peers. An attempt to evaluate the selection strategies according to resource
usage was also made. We use the total computational time TT needed at
each time step in the interaction model as the metric resource. Such compu-
tational time is composed by:
• TQ: Query time needed by the discovery service to retrieve the list of
peers subscribed to the reporter role. TQ remains constant throughout
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Figure 23: Mean absolute error with standard deviation for experiment 7.
(73 nodes, 4 peers per node, 29 perfect peers)
all the time steps and the different selection strategies.
• TSel: Selection time needed by the selection strategies to group the
sensor peers per node, compute the scores and select the peer with
the highest score per node. TSel is highly dependent on the selection
strategy and is related to the time steps.
• TG: Group formation time needed by the coordinator to create a mu-
tually compatible group between all the subscribed peers of an inter-
action model, in our case, all the sensors and the CP Unit. This time
depends on the number of peers rather than the number of nodes, and
remains constant throughout all the time steps and the different selec-
tion strategies.
• TIM : Interaction model execution time. Once the peers that will
be participating in the interaction model are selected, the interaction
model is executed at each time step. This time depends on the number
of nodes, but remain constant throughout all the time steps and the
different selection strategies.
Thus, TT is defined by Equation 4, where the time we want to evaluate is TSel
since is the variable time dependent on the currently used selection strategy.
TT = TQ + TSel + TG + TIM (4)
Since we used three different servers as execution environments, it was
difficult to compute the computational time TT and memory used for all the
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experiments. In order to compare the execution time TT for each selection
strategy, three runs for each selection strategy and Experiment 7 were carried
out using only one server (server 1). Average results are shown in Figure 24.
Figure 24: Time comparison between the different selection strategies.
We can observe that the required time in each time step TT for the Ran-
dom selection strategy remains approximately constant in all the time steps.
In order to understand these results we need to consider that many optimiza-
tion techniques were applied during the run of the experiment. For example,
every five time steps we explicitly called the Java Garbage collector, thus
influencing the time needed at that time step. We can see this if we ob-
serve the periodical bumps in all the time lines. We need to consider also
that the required time TT is not only the time consumed by the selection
strategy (TSel), but also the constant time needed for the complete execution
of the interaction model as already mentioned (TQ + TG + TIM); thus, we
need to substract this constant time from the line (which is approximately
25 seconds).
What is important to notice in Figure 24 is that both Trust and GEA re-
quired more computational time to calculate the results. The improvement
in the selection of the peers gained using Trust or GEA has a significant
computational cost (TSel), that goes from a few seconds in the initial time
steps, to an increase of almost 30 seconds for Trust and 40 seconds for GEA
in the final time steps, which may not be acceptable in highly dynamic envi-
ronments. The constant increase of the computational time along the time
steps is due to the fact that, at each time step, the Trust selection strategy
uses all the information about the previous interactions to compute the trust
score, thus increasing the amount of computation needed in each time step.
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6 Implementing different trust models in the
OK trust module
In Open Knowledge the trust module has been implemented as a separate
module from the Open Knowledge Kernel. This decision was taken consid-
ering that the computation of Trust values requires a fair amount of compu-
tational re- sources, so the selected strategy leaves the kernel as lightweight
as possible. Only those peers that require the sophisticated computation
of trust because, for example, they are running sensitive interaction models
(like in the e-Response scenario), can choose to use the trust module as a
service.
Moreover, the modularization of the trust module allows for diverse and
pluggable trust models. In order to briefly show this flexibility, we have
run the same experiments as in the previous Section 5 with a different and
simplified trust model, namely a simplified PeerRank trust model, based on
the one developed and presented in the OpenKnowledge deliverable [?].
Briefly, the PeerRank, like Page Rank, works by assigning a ranking to
a peer at any given time as a function of its previous ranking modified by
the rankings of each peer with which it has interacted, with the purpose of
measuring the relative popularity within the peer set. The ranking of peers
is dependent upon the times of succeeded interaction models that the peer
being involved in.
What we want to investigate with these experiments is two-fold: on one
hand we want just to check the flexibility of the proposed trust module archi-
tecture in supporting the replacement of trust models in the trust module;
on the other hand we want to provide some preliminary insights in the com-
parison of the use of different trust models in the same application domain
scenario.
In a first series of experiments, we have just replaced the trust model
in the trust module and used the same interaction models, experimental set
up and simulated reporter’s answers history (i.e. exactly the same series of
reporter’s answers obtained by the same random number generator function)
without any other adjustments.
The substitution of the trust model has been straightforward and we have
been able to re-run all experiments in the same time scale of the previous
experiments.
Some examples of results for this case, are presented in Figures 25 and
26. The results are presented together and in comparison with all other
trust models, i.e. noTrust (random), OK trust model, GEA and Simplified
PeerRank.
As can be seen in the graphs, the simplified PeerRank model essentially
behaves as the random selection strategy. In order to understand this be-
havior, we have to recall that the employed interaction model (as described
in Figure 5 ) cycles on all reporters. Therefore, in the Simplified PeerRank
39
model, the existence of just ones bad peer in any position, diminishes the
trustworthiness of all involved peers (also the ones that have provided good
answers). In fact in the PeerRank model, a negative trust value is assigned
to all involved peers if the overall interaction model fails for any given rea-
son. Symmetrically a positive trust value is assigned to all peers only if the
interaction model has completed successfully. In our case, this happens only
if we randomly select all good peers for all the nodes, which obviously has
a very low probability. This probability depends of course on the number
of peers that one has to select from, and as we can see in the Figure 27 ,
where the number of peers per node is 10, and we have only 2 nodes, this
error decreases in time, but in a much lower rate than all the other selection
strategies.
Figure 25: Mean absolute error with standard deviation for experiment 3 (6
nodes, 20 peers per node, 6 perfect peers) for all trust models
It is interesting to see how the Simplified Peer rank behaves with a better
suited interaction model for the specific trust algorithm. In particular, one
could rewrite - very rapidly - the overall/global interaction model as a series of
individual interaction models involving at every interaction only one querier
and one reporter per node. In this case, the interaction fails only - and more
appropriately - when a specific peer is not behaving well. Moreover, all the
blame (decrease in trust) or the praise (increase in trust) is correctly assigned
to the proper peer.
Some examples of results for this latter case (modified IM), are presented
in Figures 28 and 29. Again, the results are presented together and in com-
parison with all other trust models, i.e. noTrust (random), OK trust model,
GEA and Simplified PeerRank.
As can be seen in the graphs, now the Simplified Trust Model essentially
behaves as the OK Trust model selection strategy. The similarity between
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Figure 26: Mean absolute error with standard deviation for experiment 7 (6
nodes, 20 peers per node, 6 perfect peers) for all trust models
Figure 27: Mean absolute error with standard deviation for experiment 1 (2
nodes, 10 peers per node, 2 perfect peers) for all trust models
the two different trust model shows the effectiveness of the simple approach
to trust used in the PeerRank algorithm. We believed that this good results
- for the PeerRank - are also due to the simplicity of the selected use case: in
our experiments the reporter peer has only to provide one single information
(water level). In more complex situations, like in e-Commerce we expect the
more complex, but more powerful trust model to provide better results.
As a final comment, we want also to point out here the interesting results
that the performance of a selected trust model depends also strongly on the
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way one writes and implements the related interaction model, as can be seen
in the results presented in this section.
Figure 28: Mean absolute error with standard deviation for experiment 3 (6
nodes, 20 peers per node, 6 perfect peers) for all trust models with modified
IM
Figure 29: Mean absolute error with standard deviation for experiment 7 (6
nodes, 20 peers per node, 6 perfect peers) for all trust models with modified
IM
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7 Conclusions
7.1 Conclusion
This document has detailed the integration of the trust plug-in the the OK
Kernel. Moreover it has described an extensive evaluation of the use of the
trust component in a concrete scenario, i.e. e-Response.
Variations of the presented trust model and implementation have been
applied also in the second project test-bed (Bioinformatics). The results are
reported in the specific deliverable: D6.4 Summative report on bioinformatics
case studies and
In the present evaluation, we aimed at testing a particular hypothesis, i.e.
the fact that embedding a Trust and a GEA component (based respectively
on the Trust and GEA models as defined in the previous deliverable D4.5)
into the OK-Kernel infrastructure enhances the P2P system in the choice
of trustworthy peers, that is, peers which are likely to perform as expected
given a certain task to solve.
In conclusion of our evaluation, we can state that selecting peers by using
an informed selection strategy is always better than choosing peers randomly
in scenarios where there is the possibility that the results given by a peer may
be inaccurate. The inaccuracy may by caused either by the peer being unable
to give correct results (because is broken or is a malicious peer), or by the
results being given in an unexpected format. This improvement however
comes at the cost of computational time.
We can conclude also that, on average, Trust and GEA have very similar
results but in a open setting where many scenario configurations can be
present, Trust based selection strategy is more robust than GEA. This means
that using matching information to select peers might be deceptive in some
cases.
Moreover, we have reported some some preliminary results obtained plug-
gina a different truts model in the proposed trust module in order to access
the modularity of the trust module used in OK.
Finally, we need to point out that the Trust model needs to be further
refined from the point of view of performance, in order to retain the quality
of results in acceptable computational times.
References
[1] Giunchiglia, F., Sierra, C., McNeil, F., Osman, N., Siebes, R.: Open-
Knowledge Deliverable 4.5: Good Enough Answer Algorithms. http:
//www.cisa.informatics.ed.ac.uk/OK/Deliverables/D4.5.pdf
(2006)
[2] Pane, J., Sierra, C., Perreau de Pinninck, A., Shvaiko, P.: OpenKnowl-
edge Deliverable 4.8: Plug-in component supporting trust and repu-
43
tation. http://www.cisa.informatics.ed.ac.uk/OK/Deliverables/
D4.8.pdf (2007)
[3] Siebes, R., Dupplaw, D., Kotoulas, S., de Pinninck, A.P., van Harmelen,
F., Robertson, D.: The openknowledge system: an interaction-centered
approach to knowledge sharing. In: Proceedings of the 15th Intl. Con-
ference on Cooperative Information Systems (CoopIS). (2007)
[4] Robertson, D.: A lightweight coordination calculus for agent systems.
In: Declarative Agent Languages and Technologies. (2004) 183–197
[5] Robertson, D.: A lightweight method for coordination of agent oriented
web services. In for Artificial Intelligence, A.A., ed.: Proceedings of
AAAI Spring Symposium on Semantic Web Services, Stanford. (2004)
[6] Kotoulas, S., Siebes, R.: Deliverable 2.2: Adaptive routing in structured
peer-to-peer overlays. Technical report, OpenKnowledge (2007)
[7] Besana, P., Robertson, D.: How service choreography statistics reduce
the ontology mapping problem. In: ISWC2007. (2007)
[8] Giunchiglia, F., McNeill, F., Yatskevich, M., Pane, J., Besana, P.,
Shvaiko, P.: Approximate structure preserving semantic matching. In:
On the Move to Meaningful Internet Systems: OTM 2008. (2008) 1217–
1234
[9] Trecarichi, G., Rizzi, V., Vaccari, L., Pane, J., Marchese, M., Mc-
Neil, F., Besana, P., Robertson, D.: OpenKnowledge Deliverable 6.8:
Summative report on use of OK approach in e-Response: integration
and evaluation results. http://www.cisa.informatics.ed.ac.uk/OK/
Deliverables/D6.8.pdf (2008 (in press))
[10] Perreau de Pinninck, A., Dupplaw, D., Kotoulas, S., Schorlemmer, M.,
Siebes, R., Sierra, C.: OpenKnowledge Deliverable 1.2: Peer to peer
coordination protocol. http://www.cisa.informatics.ed.ac.uk/OK/
Deliverables/D1.2.pdf (2006)
[11] Yatskevich, M., Giunchiglia, F., McNeill, F., Shvaiko, P.: OpenKnowl-
edge Deliverable 3.4: Ontology matching component. http://www.cisa.
informatics.ed.ac.uk/OK/Deliverables/D3.4.pdf (2007)
44
